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THE GREEK VERB "TO BE" AND THE CONCEPT OF BEING

.., ';
'

by Charles H. Kahn
University of Pennsylvania
I am concerned in this paper with the philological basis for Greek ontology,
that is to say, with the raw material which was provided for philosophical

analysis by the ordinary use and meaning of the verb einai, "to be".
R oughly
stated, my question is:
how were the Greek philosophers guided, or influenced,
in their formulation of doctrines of Being, by the pre�philosophical use of this
verb which (together with its nominal derivatives on and ousia) serves to express
-the concept of Being in Greek?
Before beginning the discussion of this question, I would like to say a
word about the implications of posing it in this form.

I take it for granted
that all thinking is conditioned to some extent by the structure of the language
�n which we express or formulate our thoughts, and that this was particularly
true for the Greek philosophers, who knew no language but their ownn
I do not assume

However,

(as many modern critics seem to do) that such linguistic condi

tioning is necessarily a limitation, or a disadvantage.

A partial disadvantage

it may be, since a logical confusion can arise easily in one language �hich
would be impossible in another.
But a philosopher
even a philosopher ignorant
.•

of other languages -- is always free to make a distinction which the language
does not make for him,

just as he is free to ignore a distinction built into the

vocabulary or syntax of his speech, when he does not find this linguistic datum
of philosophic importance�
(A familiar example of the Greek philosopher's free
dom in this respect is the irony which Socrates displays whenever he refers to
Prodicus'

practice of distinguishing between the meaning of near-synonyms.)

fact that Greek philosophy has been fruitfully translated into other tongues

The
-·

notably into a language so different as Arabic - suggests that it is not language
bound in any very narrow sense.
On the other hand, it is clear that any given language permits the native
speaker to formulate certain notions, or to make certain distinctions, more easily
and more spontaneously than others•

To this extent, one language ... and I mean

one natural language, of course - may be philosophically more adequate than
another.
In this sense, I would suggest that ancient Greek is one of the most
adequate of all languages,

and that the possession of s�ch a language was in fact

a necessary condition for the success of the Greeks in creating Western logic
and philosophy - and, I suspect, also for their success in creating theoretical
science and rigorous mathematics, but this second point might be harder to defend.
In any case,

I do not intend to argue the superior merits of Greek as a

language for philosophy, nor to maintain any general thesis about the relationship
between philosophic thought and the structure of

a

given language4

I mention

these larger questions only to make clear that I wish to leave them open�

All

I hope to show is that some features of the use and meaning of einai, - features
which are less conspicuous or entirely lacking for the verb "to be" in most modern
languages - may cast light on the ontological doctrines of the Greeks by bringing
out the full significance,
expressed by esti,

and the unstated presuppositions,

einai, on and ousiao In other words,

-Purely

philological material in a

of the concepts

I propose to use the

instrumental way, not as a stick with which

to beat the ancient thinkers for ignoring distinctions which we take for granted,
but as a tool for the more adequate understanding of the Greek doctrines from
their own point of view, including those ideas which the Greeks could take for
granted but which we are inclined to ignore.
*

*

*

-2It is scarcely necessary to emphasize how important a role the concept
of Being has played in the philosophical tradition which stretches from antiquity
through the middle ages down into modern thought.
Except perhaps for the concept

of Nature,

it would be hard to mention a philosophic idea which has enjoyed a
comparable influence.
The concept of Being is still very much alive today, at
least in German philosophy:
witness Heidegger's intensive study of what he calls
the Seins frage, and Gottfried Martin 1 s recent definition of "Allgemeine Meta
··

physik'1 by reference to the classical question:
Yet we cannot
Was ist das Sein?
blink the fact that, in English and American philosophy a"t°an
te, the concept
of Being is likely to be regarded with great suspicion, as a pseudo-concept or
a mere confusion of several distinct ideas.
The most obvious distinction which

yra

seems to us to be ignored in the notion of Being is that between existence and
predication.
The logician will go further, and point out that the word 1iis"

means one thing when it represents the existential quantifier,

when it represents class-inclusion or class-membership,
represents identity, and so forth.

something else

something else when it

I shall here leave aside the distinctions based upon the logic of classes

and the strict notion of identity

(as governed by Leibniz'

not find these distinctions reflected or respected in the

verb "to be" in Greek,

law),

because I do

actual usage of the

or in English either for that matter .1

But the distinction

between the "is" of existence and the "is" of predication is now so well esta

blished in our own thought,

and even in the usage of our language,

be ignored in any discussion of Being.

I begin,

therefore,

statement of this distinction by John Stuart Mill,

that it cannot

with the classic

who claimed that

many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations

concerning the nature of being

�

•

•

which have arisen from

overlooking this double meaning of the word to be;

from

fies to be some specified thing,

•

supposing that when it signifies to exist,

seen or spoken of,

at bottom,

•

•

•

as

to be

and

a

when it signi

man,

even to be a nonentity,

answer to the same idea •

•

•

•

•

•

to be

it must still,

The fog which rose

from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over

the whole surface of metaphysics.

(Logic I,

iv. i)

Mill's distinction has not only been built into the symbolism of modern

logic;

it has also been taken over,

with remarkable unanimity,

descriptive grammars of ancient Greek.

new one for Mill,

into the standard

Although the distinction was almost a
I shall not question the use
it has now become traditional.2

of this distinction in logic,

ness in Greek grammar.

but I have very grave doubts about its appropriate

For one thing,

applying Mill's dichotomy.

there is the practical difficulty of

I can find no evidence for such a distinction in the

usage of the classical authors,

who pass blithely back and forth between uses

which we might identify as existential and copulative.

I have seen exegetes

furrowing their brow over the question whether Plato in a given passage of the
Sophist means us to take einai in the existential or the copulative sense,

whereas in fact he shows no sign of wishing to confront us with any such choice.
But there is a graver theoretical disadvantage in the traditional dichotomy

between the existential and the predicative uses of "to be".

It confounds a

genuine syntactic distinction - between the absolute and predicative construc

tions of the verb - with a further semantic contrast between the meaning !Ito

exist" and some other meaning or absence of meaning.

This fusion of a syntactic

and a semantic criterion into a single antithesis could be justified only if

-3there were a direct correlation between the two,
use of the verb is always existential in meaning,

i.e. only if
and

(1)

the absolute

(2)

the verb "to be" in

the predicative construction is always devoid of meaning,

serving as a merely
But

formal or grammatical device for linking the predicate with the subject.
these assumptions seem to me dubious for English,

and false for Greek.

In

English the existential idea is expressed by the special locution "there is"
and not by the verb "to be" alone:

there seems to be no idiomatic use of the

absolute construction of "to be11 at all.,

A sentence like 11I think therefore

I am11 is possible only in philosophy.'lb the disappearance of the absolute construc
tion corresponds the universal prevalence of the copulative use of "to be",
In historical

which is required with all predicates other than finite verbs.
terms,

one can say that the rule that every sentence must have a finite verb

has resulted in such a great expansion of the predicative use of 11to be" that
the original,

semantically fuller use of the verb has been obscured or lost,

and really survives only in the isolated locution "there is".

But this decay

of the absolute usage in most modern languages may give us a false idea of the
original range and force of the verb.

In Greek,

construction of "to be" is in full vigor,
(as we shall see).

On the other hand,

by contrast,

where the absolute

it does not necessarily mean "to exist"

since non••verbal predicates in Greek do

not automatically require a copulative esti,

the tendency towards a purely formal

use of the verb,

is not as far advanced.

devoid of semantic content,

the predicative verb is never obligatory,

Because

it may be used with a certain variety

of semantic nuances�
My position,

then,

is that Mill's dichotomy is applicable to Greek only

as a syntactic distinction between the absolute and the predicative construction,
and that even from the point of view of syntax the distinction is not as easy
to define as one might suppose.

But semantically the distinction is worse

than useless, for it leads us to take the idea of existence for granted as the
basic meaning of the Greek verb.
Now if by a word for existence one means
simply an expression which we would normally render into English by "there is",
then it is clear that the Greek verb esti often has this sense.
is accepted as it usually is,

But if existence

as a fundamental philosophic concept, distinguished

on the one hand from essence or from predicative attributes or from a proposi
tional function such as F(x),

and conceived on the other hand as the positive

feature whose negative antithesis is nothingness or nonentity or the null set,
then I would be inclined to deny that this modern notion of existence can be
taken for granted as a basis for understanding the meaning of the Greek verb.
On the contrary, I suggest that a more careful analysis of the Greek notion of
Being might provoke us into some second thoughts about the clarity and self
evidence of our familiar concept of existence.
Let me cite some evidence for what may seem the rather scandalous claim
that the Greeks did not have our notion of existence.

In the chapter of his

philosophical lexicon which is devoted to the topic "being" or "what is",
to on (Met.

Delta

7),

Aristotle distinguishes four basic senses of "to be"

in Greek:

1.

being per accidens, or random predication (i.e.

"X is Y",

without regard to the logical status of subject and predicate).

2.

being per se, or predication in good logical form according to
the scheme of the categories (e.g�, when a quality is predicated
of a substance).

Here einai is said to have as many senses

as there are categories,

and Aristotle points out that a con-

-4struction with 11to be"

may be substituted for any finite verb,

e.g., 1;he is walking'' for nhe walks".

3.

cinai and esti may mean "is true11, and the negative means "is

An example is "Socrates is musical", if one says this

false".

(with emphasis) because it is true:

4.

Finally,. nbeing11 may mean either being in potency or being in

act.

"For we say that something is seeing both when it is

potentially seeing (capable of sight) and when it is actually

seeing.i:

Aristotle's procedure here is not purely lexical:

usage in the light of his philosophical conceptions.

he is analyzing ordinary

But my point is that

neither Aristotle's own conceptual scheme nor the normal usage of the verb obliges
him to make any place for a sense of einai which we would recognize as distinc

tively existential.

Furth�rmore, in every one of Aristotle's examples the verb

is construed as predicative, although the general topic for the chapter is given
in the absolute form, "what is".3

The syntactic distinction between predicative

and absolute construction is treated here as of no consequence whatever.
As a second illustration of the gap between Greek nbeing"

and our notion

of existence, I take the famous openj_ng sentence from ::;�otagoras' work
"Man is the measure of all things,

that it is not11

(ton onton hos esti, ton me onton hos ouk esti).

significant and emphatic a

use

of theVerbas G::eek canoffer.

struction is absolute, we might be inclined to
here.

On Truth:

of what is, that it is , of ·what is not,

This is as

Since the con�

interpret the verb as existential

But there are two difficulties in the way of such an interpretation.

In

the first place, Frotagoras clearly intends to make men the measure of all things,

i.e., of all matters of fact or alleged fact, not merely of questions of existence.

His statement is more appropriate as the opening sentence of a oork on truth if

we give the verb a very genera 1 sense:

nman is the measure of what is the case,

that it is the case, and of what is not so, that it is not soo11

The second

objection to understanding the verb as existential here is that Plato, when he

quotes this dictum in the Theaetetus,

of the predicative construction:

immediately goes on to explain it by means

"as each thing seems to me, such is it for me;

as it seems to you, such is it for you"

emoU.

(hoia � phainetai, �uta �n

And he illustrates by the example of a wind which is cold for one man,

but not for another.

is at least unlikely),

Unless Plato is radically misrepresenting Protagoras

(which

I'rotagoras himself must have intended his dictum to apply

to facts stated in the predicative, and not merely in the existential form.

Even if Plato were misinterpreting Pi:·otagoras, his interpretation would show

that for a Greek philosopher, the meaning of a strong use of einai in the absolute
construction is not necessarily existential.

Plato's exegesis becomes entirely

natural and intelligible if we understand the absolute use of einai as I have
Suggested;

the case11•

as an affirmation Of

The existential use7

atoms and the void11,

fact in general, aS

e.g.

nwhat is SO" or :i,.Uhe!t :i.G

for an affirmatior. such as 11there are

wo uld then be included

as a special case of the general factual
assertion intended by Protagoras' statement hos esti.
If man is the measure of
all things, "that they are so or not sorr, then he is the measure of the existence
or nonexistence of atoms just as he is the measure of the being-cold or not

b eing-cold of the wind.

These remarks are intended to render plausibl e my claim that,

sophical usage of the verb,
(without predicates)

for the philo

the most fundam ental value of einai when used alone

is not 11to existn but 11to oe sor•
0to be the . case" ' or
'
It is worth noting that this meaning o[ the verb, which appears
among the four uses listed in the chapter of Met. Del ta summarized above (where
If

to be true11•







`Nq}^~T1 ǧłðűɘ ɥ r/} 9 ɥ ɥ  ɥ ɥ ɥ  ɥ

# [ $Əɥ

Ưɥ  ɥ  ɥ ɥ 4? 6òɥ 6Ƶɥ ƐƭǤqɥ H®ºɥ ª«t¬I*ɥ 9W} # I}

 ɛ

J ɥ $   g^ " ɥ  ɥ Ȩɥ ht`H'u;p}a  Ǉȩɥ xe/DK fg yTU} ȑ ɥ 5ɥ ǈɥ Oǉɥ
q} LÙɥ  

HI½ɥ $?

pD} !:/,89 ?

 /

ÏģóĤɥ

Æ!ɥ \ɥ Ɉɥ  Ȫɥ ɥ ĥɥ ėɥ ɏ
Ǫ

ɥ D~ɥ

ǩ ɥ æ ɥ Ðǝ

Ęɥ <0:&} ɥ Ħ Ȋ`ɥ ɥ ɥ

Ìɥ Ų 4ɥ  ųŴ ɥ fɥ ȫ ɥ ǫħɥ ÖÉȋRɥ ęɥ ɥ ɥ  /ɥ

Ȓɥ Ǭ ɥ ( 7 ɥ

"ɥ ɥ # rɥ

? ȓŵɥ Ȭɥ ¯Ŭɥ ɥ

Kɥ Y,8biv"Y- »  ɥ ɥ

  ôɥ ɥ Ņɥ & '( ɥ
W] ɥ G!ɥ ɥ ĩɥ ɥ

!,'/

ɥ Pɥ ɥ ɥ Ĩɥ X^jv  õɥ  ɥ ɥ  ɥ

HLh} ņ7ɥ ɥ @

ɥ  ( ƶǞöɥ

Ŷɥ ǭɥ 1X}

YF=xi=z} ɥ Fxt} j,s} ɆƑ ɥ ŷɥ ǟ;ɥ Eȭɥ ç ɥ 0 ɥ ɥ ɥ
 ɥ ɥ ɥ ɥ Z Ȕɥ ƒ UƓ÷ɥ
( ɥ
(;g 

"ɥ 

%ɥ ɥ Ǯɥ Ú# ɥ p uɞɥ

øɥ ɥ ɥ

ɥ

Jɥ

*ɥ  ɥ OY,I
ɥ }

;ɥ ɥ "(2ɥ %ɥ

ɥ ɥ  ɥ HIl29H=}  ƿɥ

Ǌɥ Ěɥ k ¡¢ɥ ɥ
(

Ź ź

ɥ

8

ɥ

ɥ 5ɥ Ȯɥ  ɥ Î% Sɥ

"ɥ (RZVbɥ Ɋɥ ɥ ɥ $Żīɥ ŭǄɥ ŉɥ

ȯ-Ȗɥ Ʒěɥ  ùƸ ɥ Ŋɥ £¤ɥ } ɥ ¥¦ȗǋɥ
Ä ɥ #

(",/

/ a ɥ +.? ǯ ɥ DN} ɥ Dɥ  ɥ ,ɥ

 Ÿ ɥ

.ɥ ɥ A ɥ ɉǠ ɥ ňǰɥ  

ɥ ɥ ɥ

 ɥ Ňɥ ɥ ɥ ƦFɥ 3&sɥ  ɥ  Ī ɥ ɥ Å ɜ

ȕɥ ɥ 5ɥ k/} WuBM}

 ɥ

ɥ  ɥ

¸iȌƧɥ

ɥ ǍȘżɥ ɥ =ɥ >Mɥ șɥ ɥ

Ôǌɥ

x>=9y OZ}

Ĭɥ ĭɥ ɥ  ɗɥ

úɥ 3Yɥ 0Ûɥ Ñɓŋɥ \^ .^%} R\; ɋȰɥ ɥ ɥ  ɥ 2- ! )?

 &-!ɥ $ 

-/

 ûɥ " Ü( ɥ

 ɥ ü

ɥ c#ǱýĮƹɥ hɥ = Ț  *1ɥ

Y 3&ɥ ɥ K2( ɥ 34F@}  ɥ    Ĝɥ (  x   ɥ Nɥ Ōəɥ  ɥ E'}
 ɥ ǲƔ$ ɥ Ƭɥ  ɥ ĝ¶Fhþɥ y ǡɥ ɥƕɥ E
 ɐ ǴéƖ ɥ ō]ɥ

#Y/ ɥ  ɥ 

G ɥ ! ɥ  ɥ ȍƨɥ vw ɥ Őɥ ɥ
 T İ ɥ

ɥ

ɥ ǳ

ǎɥ èɥ ɥ @ Ý Bɥ

eɥ Ŏɥ ɥ ŏįɥ ɥ ɥ

 8Ğɥ Q

țɥ œɥ ȱɥ Ȳÿ ɥ ɥ ')ɥ l2\m; =aF}   ) 

/&} Œ%ɥ

CƗɥ  Þɥ

ɥ őɥ ɥ ɥ ɥ + $ɥ
ɥ 56 ?

wm} "( 0[} %ɥ ưƱǵ ĀǶ)ȜC>āɥ Ŕɥ ^YG* _f^n3 0 ɥ 6Ǐɥ ȳ ɥ <ǷT?ɥ Qɥ +A'SǸ *1ɥ
L ɥ ŕ

 ȴɥ ıɑƘ Ăɥ 2\} ƙɥ 4`^0^zl ǹɥ +ɔ

Ŗɥ Ɔ,ɥ µ× ɥ

¾ɥ 9#X_V:

o ɥ Ê /#ɥ

Ǻ ɥ ɥ È9ɥ JǑXǜɥ ^Ř ȝ ɥ ɥ Ů ß[ɥ

)/

;0A*}  ɥ 3*?  ɥɥ

ǒ Žɥ §¨ɥ  Ȟ-ăƲƚžɥ ȵɥ Ĵɥ Ȏ ɥ x ɥ à Ɍǻ ğ°ɥ
,}  
Í

&==x]} řɥ ¼ ȟɥ


ɥ ɥ %0   ɥ @9+/s} ê,ɥ #ƛ ɥ &} |0^} _.Dw?} `x))9"} sD} ɥ xC y

fĵɥ ^V/ "2ɥ(1ɥ

ɥ Śɥ }± y

3 &ɥ  ɥ Ǿ$

Ʃǁ9Ǧɥ ůƪȸɥ Ƴɥ
şɥ +

śǼɥ ȶɡɥ ɥ ǽ Nɥ ɥ  ɥ lɥ Pp Ķ

ǿ ɥ )ɥ "Ąɥ ȷķɥ
Ĺ1ɥ

r@B;o}9, G= 6 P9(={}

/

  ɥ ?ɥ XǐMOɥ

D4Z f^5qj &ɥ Ò ɥ ÇƇɥ  ɥ Ńɥ ƈĲ ɥ ŗɥ

  

 ą'ɥ J[ CK+E ɥ

ɥ _c9s9b9/ Ǔɥ
ſ !ɥ Ŝɥ À8ĸƴɥ

Ó ɥ 5ɥ  ɥ 6ǂ gdɥ ŝɥ B) ɥ $ɥ ɥ ë ɥ
,2( ȹƉĺɥ ȠƜǃȺɥ Şɥ Ȼ \!ɥ 7? & ('?

.ɥ ɥ Ɲ ɥ  ǔ Ļɥ

0? ȼƞáƺɥ # ! ( vF#{ ɥ ɥ Šɥ CȀ Ɗɥ

ĆƟćƠɥ B} &Á ńĠƀɥ ơɥ Ƚjɥ äɥ šɥ `ƫɕɥ ( ȁɥ Ⱦɢȿɥ ɥ
B} v/!B} ɥ
Ɂɥ ɥ 

ɥ Ȣ í ɥ

 ɥ ɂɥ ɥ )Ȧɥ 'ɥ > < ?

Y ɥ ɥ mɥ ɥ Gɥ {| 'ɥ X;d7U 'ɥ Ââɥ
"ţɥ

)ɥ ;`^,]g  ɥ +!ȅ ɥ
ǣBɥ }

M@&B5b}

ɃƋɥ /c ɥ  ɥ ɥ HS!7o9y#}

ũ8ɥ 7 ɥ  ɥ Ū
 (

 

=?

RVB6&W}

: ɥ ɥ .ɥ 1? ? ;% ?
Ǝɥ ɥ Ď< Ë©ɥ

4 ɥ Õɥ ǖɥ î Ǘɥ  ɥ % ɥ ïW ɥ

¿Ȇɥ .ɥ ¹ɒɥ Dɥ ǘɥ ďǙ,ĐƢɥ ɍɄɥ e^|!A^#p ƌɥ ɥ / VƼɥ

ɥ %  ɥ

³Űƾ Ĕɥ Pɥ

ɀ z

.&+#/

 Ǖ4ɥ Ťɥ :!ɥ  ɥ ťaɥ  ɥ Ŧ^ ɝ

_ ɥ ɥ ;ǆ _ɥ č=Ľɥ ƃU ɥ

B} 

#* /

ɥ xB&QanB}  ɥ ɥ ã ɥ åA ĉ ɥ Ȅɥ ȣɥ

Ċɥ #ċ·´ɠ-Ƃɥ ²Čƻɥ  ɥ ɥ ɥ

ɥ -ɥ

$ /

 Ȃȡ ɥ ɥ ( Ĉ >ɥ ɥ & ,ġƁ ɥ ȃ ɤɟìļ  Ţɥ B}  $&}

9ɥ ŧɥ ľɥ ɥ đɥ ĿĒƽɥ ēȤ.ɥ Ũɥ ɥ ! ɚ

ɥ

ū7ɥ #>?LfX#}Q^Y B}

ɥ ɥ ɥ bƤ
@  2ɥ

ɥ 4ɥ ȇ ɥ ɥ

ɥ

e!ɥ

ƣ ɥ

J@&C8$c} Ƅ ɥ $ɥ ɥ

: 'ɥ gƍɥ u#gS <ɥ ɥ Ȉ ŀ%ɥ ɥ ɥ ɥ _`;)Mp<W

dɥ ɥ ƥǚnɥ  ɥ G-6=EdDH/%M}  ƅ?ȥɥ ɥ  ɥ Ɏɥ ɥ ĢȉŁɅ ɥ Ȑɥ


u® tu^7z ®



Fɧ ¡0ɧ 7[q ɧ

ơôɧ ɧ r3® Ȕɧ
ɧ ɧ ɧ ^u{&`|'¤a74®
 ǔƶɧ ġõƴ ɧ æɈɧ "/ǌĭ&#ɧ Ģɧ w~94`(¡`ut® ® ɧ
ɧ (ŉ4 ɧ  ȕ<Ʒɧ
#©® `t}u4¤(`tV® ɧ

CŊ ɧ Ŧɧ ǲɧ $9P\jq
ǳ)ɧ ]8ňǕɧ >ƸǴĮɧ ŋɧ
 ¥^`(^® ,ɧ ?ɧ
Ō ɧ ¡u® ɧ ^:® t ɧ ōɧ  Ȗ ɧ  ɧ ) ɧ  .ģöƢɧ ɀKDɧ AA ,ɧ L  ɧ ÷ɧ ȗgɧ
u® ¦u® xu`t ®
^8® 9 ǵɧ Ǎɧ ɧ øƣɧ ŧùɧ ¾úɧ ç?ɧ ɧ k>ØDɧ
Ĥɧ įɧ Wqq`)k® Ó 'žɧ u ® ;® ɧ `t®   %
ɧ J(®
R ɧ 

ɧ Ƕɧ uK® $<`tXu® q $:® # u
A 4® è ɧ ɧ ¨¼© Ɯûɧ !ɧ ;ɧ oȘɧ Vɧ
2ɧ `L®  ® Ŏ
ſƺɧ Ƿɧ șɧ ɧ Eü$ ɧ ƀǸĥ!ɧ ɧ `t® q L  3
ɧ ŏɧ "ƻ&Bɧ
#3ɧ (q ¿Îɧ `® "ǹ@ɧ
ÊƁ ɧ Ƃɧ  Ħɧ ²ɒÕɚ
 ɧ :ɧ #ɧ   XȚ/Ɇɧ ýțª½k&ɧ ɧ ƃɧ  þ ɧ u® ɧ ɉɧ ɧ éɧ ƄǖɊ^ɧ
Y  ɧ ɧ ɧ ÿĀm ƅǗ ɧ GȾɧ 
ɧ Ũ ɧ   % ´ɧ Ȝɧ "q ǺOɧ
Â
ȝǘ ǋxɧ
 ɧ  74 3 ( 2 ɧ `t® ɧ _Ƽ /-ȞƆɧ 
 ɧ  % % ǻǼ ɧ  ɧ ɧ Tǽ>¶¡ȟɧ
ɧ ɧ ā. ɧ ɧ 
%ɧ =t(>® $ Eɧ ® Ùɧ Għɧ ^® _7®  " H& 1 >® Ɂİɧ
\ɧ Ƈɧ Ő

ɧ ɧ 4``s*® $ɧ .ƽɧ 4 $b+®
ĂȠ
ɧ őɧ ũıɧ ,ɧ 4u® ɧ ɧ ɧ
 ɧ ȡɧ 9   Ȣɧ ³#ɧ $Ú  ɧ ê ɧ ųɧ !$" % ɧ ɧ ɧ Ūɧ ¥Áɧ
ɧ  Wɧ  ɧ ɧ Ǚă $ǚƤ ɧ ɧ ɧ K6ɧ uM®  ȣ yɧ
ɧ I,ut4® xu`t® ,ɧ ?ɧ Ȥɧ
 Æ Ɖ %ɧ

0ɧ  ɧ ŴĲɧ  ƈ Ąɧ

ƲȽɧ $?®  pɧ `® ɧ J ɧ ɧ 

ūɧ `® Hɧ Ǿ1ɧ

¡^`tY® (4 u® ɧ 7ɧ -QOɧ

Ëɧ `® ȥ
ɧ ɧ Œɧ Ɗɧ ǎ= ƥƦ ɧ ɧ ȓÛ Ȧɧ  ĳƝǊɧ lǏ( ·ɧ lɧ ɧ ɧ Xǿɧ
Ǜɧ ƾɧ ɧ -<® `® ® œ5*ɧ u¬«®
 1m + `% ɧ ȧFɧ ɋǜ 3ɧ
ɧ ƋĨƟYɧ ¤@® Ŕɧ
7ƌÜɧ  ɧ ɧ ǝɧ ɧ  % u+Nɧ ƞ ɧ Ȁɧ v¤®
!4 G ƍ ɧ h ® ȁɧ )&4
 ɧ
: ɧ Ǝŵ ɧ ɧ ɧ Ȩ* ɧ   ɧ hɧ ŕąɧ Ý %ɧ
4Ǟǟ Ćɧ Ǡɧ

ÑɌɧ  ɧ .ɧ ɧ Aɞɧ

ȩɂƧɧ dpxne.¡cut® ëĴɍZɧ n,eq

ǡɧ ɧ Al cut^`x® ;ɧ

4  / Zt 04
4Yq i+q * ɧ  ɧ ɧ +¸ɟ ɧ Ŗɧ gŶɧ Ȃ* Ȫɧ f+gq 5hq 6Zq !  ć %ɧ
f-eq ɧ  ɧ `ɧ uw?t® bɧ 1Ǣ ɧ <ŗɧ ƿ ɧ  ɧ ;%q .4 =ɧ Iɧ ɧ [-ɧ ǀɧ ŷ±ȃɧ

ƨŬIĈÞƩɧ J ĉɧ 9ɧ ȫ

ȬŸɧ t5® -4 `® u®

 ì)ɧ ^:®

"  '` ɧ /Ȅɧ ǐŘɧ \;®

ȅəɧ řɧ _ q ȭTɧ Əɧ ɧ 9"  fɧ C8=!q

 W]  ɧ uN®

ɧ Ɏµĵɧ 4

 ɧ $ɧ Ɛɧ ɧ Q1ɧ i$ɧ ɧ Ȯ Źƛǰɧ ǣɧ )ɧ cȯU+¹ɧ ¡]B® O(® 2ß Çźɧ

b)q 4 ɧ Ǥ ǥ!ɧ `® +ɧ

¢ɠɧ ;  @Pɧ

ɧ Ì#   Ȉɧ u 1?® 24 Ċǁɧ  ɧ

t® ɧ 7"ǦȆɧ 0ɧ ɧ KHq

6 =ɧ Fɧ  ȉɧ ɧ ǂɧ 

ɧ ċČ Pɧ

C Ȱɧ Śɧ ' ǧɧ Ķɧ čĎ ɧ `® ¤;®  ďƪ ɧ "o]"q ,4 ĐȱȲɧ ɧ śđ)Ȋɧ ɧ ɔɧ
 ºɧ Ġ ɧ `®  ɧ {ɑiɧ

CĒ ķɧ ǑŜɧ Żƒɧ ĸēȋ ɧ 2utt;(`ut®

ɧ t4® P2¡q tu® 0utQ£`ut® 

1Í#ɧ 

ɧ  'ɧ

ɧ [ɧ 3ɧ

 ɧ OVmBcWq v§«a ɧ % q$iZ¤gª® `t®

À ȳɧ *ɧ  íŮ  ɧ

Vɧ uR® Ĕ   îɧ  ȵĕɧ ɧ

 

ɕɧ ǃĹǨȴȌfɧ ȿ ǩɧ  ɧ ¡u®

 ůɧ ɧ Cm¡`ut^`x® ïȶɏĺǄɧ ƫàD Ű7ɧ

 ɧ Ǫá ɧ §^`(^® ^8® D7j® ^ ȍɧ `ɧ ť®ɧ Èǫǅ
ɐ5ɧ jɧ  !  ɧ ¬aŝ4dɧ Ȏ ȏɧ ɧ
ÒƬMɧ

5ɧ Şɧ Ã

ɧ ĩɧ ɧ

ɧ ȷ d  cw®

ɧ

ɧ ɧ  ɧ ɧ S¤t4q7tn® uo?® %u¡^® #4

M.R_I`?Sq »ǒɧ şɧ >'ɧ 2*ɧ ȸ.ɧ Ļɧ

,ɧ `® tu® 

ɧ u®   - >q +ɧ nu® 49(}`x `ut® ;ɧ ^7® Ä Ƶ}~|ɧ

ɧ

   ɧ JɃƭɖɧ u¦ÏƮɧ ɧ qLȹɧ ɧ   ɧ d pmGq (ɧ r?ɧ Ɣɧ ɤ£6 ɧ

ǆ ɧ ðɧ

#ɝɧ

ɧ ! !ɧ u® 7 0ɧ ! ɧ  Ǳ ɧ ļ ɧ <+Šɧ ɧ Ľɧ Ôɇɧ hjɧ

 ɧ ¡¤(¤7® \ɧ I ɧ 3Xq Um*q  e ɧ ɧ ñɧ   ɧ "ǬľȐ ɧ `t®

' ǭ%ɧ

ɧ ÉƠɧ *ut(9x® ;ɧ  Ʉżɧ <ɧ ǮĖ ɧ  eBɧ

Ǔɧ 8ȑ+ɥÖɧ ¡ɧ

t- "® ^u®

Ŀɧ

ɧ ut¢!®

Å=ɧ



*ɧ ã ɧ 9ɧ i+ q ƕ¤Eɧ ɧ (ėɧ 2Ⱥɧ Ę@ɧ ɧ  ɧ  8ɧ ǇĪɧ

:ɧ ɧ ^`t[® ^®  ɧ ɧ ɧ  ɧ  ɧ  ɧ
® `6®   ɧ ɧ Q:k<;^Dq :ɧ Ðtɧ
ǈɧ šɧ

Ɩę

ɧ ɧ ě¯°ƗƯ ɧ E¨`9t`n® `t®

òɧ  5 ɧ ɗɧ  ǯɧ

  ɧ "( ɧ ɘɧ ^=® U$  ? ɧ JETaNlb/JFq

/  `ɧ 1ut¤/`ut® ɧ Lɧ

S0 )ņ ɧ

HKɧ Ĝư ɧ fɧ Ʌɧ

    `  ɧ uT® ɧ ŀ īƘĝåƱɧ Łǉc6ɧ Ţɧ Ȼłɧ Ń óɧ

 !ɧ  ɧ Ȓɧ `® y¤`F® ĬbĞɧ ţ  ɧ ^G®
ɧ w 

ɧ ɧ ɧ  ɧ Ě( &ɛ

äŲ%ɧ

S&ɧ /ɧ

ut`4H®

-zɧ ɧ



   4

&q ğ

Rɧ

wɧ ńɓƙsɧ ɧ _dɧ $%'3

ɧ ɧ

 ɧ Ņɧ Uu¤t4® %

`  * ?Mɧ " Bɧ

 ɧ f® u ®

Zq# %

` ɧ Ňɧ Ťɧ ƚȼ ɧ

ST
Ūɍ  
ɍ 
!ɍ Ƣɍ Ƶɍ jƣ0ɍ Ǝ Ǹɍ eɍ ȥƶɍ Îɍ  ɍ īɍ
ɍ :ɍ Ĭ%ɍ ɍ  ɍ ĭɍ ĮHÏ9ɍ
/Zǹɍ ɍ ȧɍ ǢƝćɍ
  ɍ ! ɍ  *ɍ
ɍ ɍ įɍ   Ǻɍ ǻǼɍ ɍ ǣɍ 
*7D)ɍ

ɍ ɍ 

F ɍ ɍ ɍ Ŝ ɍ   #ɍ 

ɍ  " ɍ  ɍ ɍ  Ǥk#ɍ Ʒɍ Âɍ ¶ɍ
ɍ §' Pɍ p

)Eɍ

ɍ

ɍ ɍ +ɍ  ɍ µɍ ɍ

1Ƥɍ e* ɍ 

 ȟ ɍ

¨ɍ Pɍ %İ ɍ Ȩū

 ɍ ;7  ɍ %Ãɍ Aɍ ɂɍ

ȶ ɍ  ɍ ɍ

% ɍ ,ɍ "ɍ ɍ Əŝ ɍ ɍ Ƹ ɍ 
ɍ

Ð ¢ɃQɍ <ɍ & ɍ  qAɍ

Aɍ ɍ

ɍ 6ɍ  ɍ  V:ɍ ɍ

ǽɍ  ɍ ɍ ɍ   ɍ uɍ
<ıɍ

ɍ ȩɍ  ɍ ɍ ɍ ɍ  ɍ


 'Ȼ ɍ ɍ Ĉɍ ɍ

ɍ ²¬ ^ ɍ  ,ɍ

 "ɍ O ɍ ɍ Ŭɍ  Ñ8Uɍ ,¡ ɍ Vɍ ƥɍ ǥɍ Ò O4ɍ
 ɍ  ɍ Ƴ ɍ $ɍ Ȫ a ƺɍ ɍ     
ɍ ɍ

ɍ 6ɍ 'ɍ

ɍ ɍ 

ɍ ɍ ŭ

( ċɍ 9ɍ
ɍ

[ɍ ɍ ƹɍ

ĉɍ

ɍ $ɍ  Ċɍ ;"Ɛɍ ɍ 

%  ɍ  "Rɍ ɍ ³ Ôƻɍ ɍ Ƽ ɍ ɍ ɍ
ɍ # 3ɍ  ɍ Õ Ůɍ 

ɍ ɍ ɍ

ɍ
Ƚ

ɍ Ʀɍ

Z ɍ ɍ ɍ Ƒ ɍ Čɍ ɍ Ǿɍ Öɍ @ ɍ M ɍ

Ǧ" ɍ ɍ čɍ ǧǨɍ 6ɍ vɍ 1ɍ <ɍ

ɍ  ɍ 
;ŞƒŰ#ɍ ɍ

 ɍ  %ɍ ƽDɍ

ɍ $ɍ Ƨɍ ɍ ɍ  ɍ ɍ × &Iɍ ɍ 
ɍ ɍ  ɍ Øɍ Ĳɍ ɍ

o ɍ ɍ  ɍ
  ɍ

ɍ

Xɍ  8ɍ $$!ɍ 'ɍ ɍ Äɍ

F ?ɍ Ʉɍ

ɍ  ůɍ ɍ

ÙűĎɍ Ú !ɍ ɍ 5+Qɍ

ɍ śɍ ɍ ƾɍ ɍ Ɯɍ ɍ Ųɍ ĳɍ ɍ ȷɍ ɍ

 0ɍ ɍ

ɍ Åɍ 

ďMzɍ [ţɍ ȫɍ ·

ɍ  ɍ 

ɍ

 ɍ ɍ $ɍ /{|ɍ ɍ ɍ  £Ʌɍ bɍųɍ l )Rɍ Nɍ  ɍ  ɍ

ĵɍ  ɍ ɍ 

Ⱦ

  ɍ Ĵ

ɍ

cƿɍ ɍ

ɍ $   ɍ *Ŵɍ & Đɍ Ķɍ ɍ , Ó ɍ ɍ ƴ đɍ ŵĀķK%ɍ ɍ ǿ ɍ Ƭȿ
_ȀÛɍ ɍ ȬĒɍ Æk
Gɍ 

ɍ % ɍ $ɍ ȂŶɍ

 ɍ ɍ

 ǁɍ <ɍ ,

ɍ ɍ "ɍ Ĺɍ ɍ , ɍ

ɍ ŷǩÞ ƭɍ ,fɍ  bɍ ĸ   ɍ !# ȃ ɍ

Ɠ ` ɍ ƔĔɍ # Ȅɍ ɍ ÇǪɍ ɍ ȅɍ ĺɍ

 ɍ  ǂ! ɍ ɍ ŸɆßɍ ɍ àáǃāɍ
Ȇ ǆȭɍ ɍ  (7ɍ

ǀÜHȁēɍ Ý }ɍ

ŹǬ ȇɍ ɍ  ɍ 

ɍ 
gɍ ĻǄ0ɍ ¯Ƞɍ N ɍ   ǅ
.ǫɍ
  ƨɍ fɇɍ 5+ɍ  "~ɍ
- ɍ ļǇ>Ȉɍ

 ɍ ɍ , ¸ɍ ɍ +ƞƟɍ 2ɍ  *ǈɍ ƕ" ũɌȉźâɍ #  ɍ  ɍ  4ɍ
^ɍ Ľ % ɍ
Gɍ >Ť

Ʈɍ ɍ ] ɍ şĖ 8

ɍ ɍ ɍ 'ɍ ɍ

- ĕɍ

 ɍ ɍ Ăľɍ c4ɍ

ɍ !.&ɍ mɍ  ɍ .ã=ɍ  ȡ ɍ Ŀɍ ( ɍ ǉÈ9ɍ

©9ɍ



- ɍ  Ǌɍ ǭ äȊEɍ

3ɍ &L ɍ / " #ɍ

°åɍ ɍ ɈY& ėȋɍ ɍ

*ɍ ɍ ȮƖ ɍ +ȯɍ

ŀǋȌ Ɨ#ɍ ɍ &oȸɍ ɍ «.Ƙ Ż)ɍ  ɍ 

ɍ 3>ɍ

ƯŁɍ ɍ 5+ɍ  ɍ Ęɍ ¹ǌ!Ǎȼ ɍ ȹɍ ɍ  ǎ ɍ ư æ *&ɍ ç¦ɍ Ȱ ɍ  ɍ
8x 6ę#ɍ ɍ ®ɍ ɍ  ɍ dèȍ4ɍ
- Ǯɍ \ Ȏ  ɍ =2Ʃéȏżɍ 2ǯɍ
Ǐ"ɍ Ěpɍ Ž
 ɍ Śɍ ǰ0ɍ Jɍ É ɍ ǐ ɍ ɍ
SƠ hłêɍ

ɍ ɍ

(Ǳɍ Ǒɍ $ɍ $ɍ 
ë ɍ ȱ ɍ

ɍ r ǒǲUɍ #ɍ ɍ Ȑ ěɍ ºɍ ȑĜ *&ɍ 

ǓŃìɍ ɍ

&

ĝń!#ɍ »Lɍ ȲžȒ ȓɍ í ¼7ɍ Ņɍ ɍ

?ɍ
- ɍ ǔɍ

ɍ J0ɍ ɍ Ğɍ ɍ Ȕ ɍ îɍ   ɍ ɀ
- ɍ ăņŇ%ð ɍ 6ɍ  ÊH.ɍ ȕɍ ñ Ʊ'ɍ ɍ ɍ ±tň Ɂ

ſɍ  ɍ =ɍ ɍ 'Ǖ ɍ ɍ
ï. ɍ :"ɍ  )ɍ
ğ ɍ ɍ  ɍ

(ɍ ŉɍ 2ȳɍ Ŋɍ ȴ ! ɍ  ɍ ½ò(ɍ ɍ Ȗɍ ǳɍ ó

Tƀ Kɍ ɍ 
ɍ ɍ

ǖ'ɍ @  ɍ ġ

/ ɍ 

ǚɍ

Ȣ Ģɍ ɍ 

ǜƍĄɍ j õ)#ɍ ɍ ɍ  ɍ  ɍ ŋɍ

  ɍ 1)Eɍ

 ɍ ɍ

-ťɍ

ģ%d!3ɍ  iɍ (ɍ Ŧɍ
ɍ
ɍ ÷

ɍ ,? ?ɍ

 ƅ"ɍ ɍ ɍ
ö Ƕɍ 

Ōɍ nɍ

 ɍ Ȝ ɍ   ƙȝƆ7ɍ Kɍ

Yɍ 5+ɍ ɍ

Ĥgɍ ƚ ɍ  ĥ ɍ ōɍ 3'Iɍ  wɍ ɍ ɍ

 ɍ Ëɍ ɍ ɉɍ  ɍ Ŏɍ *ɍ ŧĦǝɍ  &ɍ ø 'Ƿɍ  Ìɍ ȣ ù ɍ
ɍ ɍ

ȗ ɍ

 ɍ ƫɍ șƂWɍ  ɍ Țɍ ǗƲǘ lɍ  ɍ 1ƃBɍ ɍ

0ɍ 1ɍ  Ǚ=#ɍ 2ț ɍ 'ɍ  ɍ
ǛLiɍ ɍ Ƅɍ / ɍ

ɍ

ǴĠƪǵɍ ¾ôɍ ɍ  ¥ȘƁȦJBɍ ɍ ɍ  ɍ N_ ɍ .ɍ

$!Dɍ

X .ɍ M ɍ ŏɍ

ɍ ȵWɍ ]nmɍ
ɍ ɍ 8Ƈɍ

ɍ / ħ(#ɍ  ¤ɊŐ !Bɍ ɍ $  % )ɍ ɍ

őɍ ! ɍ ŒǞɍ  ɍ ƈŠƛ0ɍ
C ǟ(ɍ ơ4ɍ
- ɍ  ɍ œɍ ɍ
 Ĩąɍ ŕɍ  # GC;  1ɍ Àû 3ǡɍ
¿Ǡɍ  ɍ ɍ ɍ Ŕ ɍ ȤŨ! ɍ
"#
F ɍ @ aɍ  ĩɍ  üý  ɍ ȞƉɍ ɍ ÍĪɍ Ŗ\ ŗ
ɍ  Ćɍ Ɗɍ
ª

+ɍ @ɍ ɍ  ɍ

 Iɍ ÿȺɍ /ɍ  Áɍ  ɍ  hɍ 5+ɍ 

>ɍ ɍ ɍ ɍ ɍ

Ř`()#ɍ Ƌɍ ɍ

ɍ ɍ :ɍ sɍ

" šɍ  ɍ þƌ Ţɍ řɍ ɋy

ɍ

,..,
-,;-

been completed by introducing aorist or perfect

root.

Thus Latin incorporated fui,

:forms form a different verbal

futurum into the system of -�'

just as

English acquired pe, ,Y�n ;:;:-om the same root, and �' � from anothe;:
German war,

(cf.

has lost

gewcscn).

f\.s a result,

the

(or at any rate gravely weakened)

verb

som_·ce

11to be11 in these lanzuages

the ;:wpectual value which charac

terized the I. -E. stem �·:es-, whereas the Greek verb einai, has faithfully

preserved, or even strengthened,

its durative l:haracter.

What is the philosophic significance of this rnorpho-semantic fact?

think it may help us to understand

present, an untroubled state oE duration,

Being and Becoming, and

(3)

I

the Greek notion of eternity as a stable

(1)

(Z)

the c.lassical antithesis of

the incommensu:cabiHty already noted between the

Greek concept of being and the modern-medieval notion of existence.
Let me illustrate these points briefly.

are theoi aien eontes,

The gods in Homer and Hesiod

(1)

In this and in a whole set

nthe (30ds who arc forever."

of related uses, �inai has practically the sense nto be 1llive, to survive11•

The gods � forever because they are deathless beings:
continues without end.

tl'c

Now, strictly speaking,

their vital duration

tho gods are not eternal.

duration had a temporal beginning.

It is

As

their vital

Theogony informs us in some detail, they have all been ].Jorn:

the philosophers who introduce an

absolute arche or Beeinning uhich ir-: itself unbq;un, a permanent and ungenerate<l

source of generation.

The initiator here is probably Anaximander, but we

see the result more clearly in the poem of Parmenideo.
in the strong sense:

it is ungenerated

(agen�ton) as well as unperishing

Limited neither by birth nor by death,

(anolethron).

c an

His being is :forever

the duration of }l' hat is

replaces and transcends tl:.e unendinz, survival -.;Jhich characterized the Olympian
gods.

(2)

Parmenides was also the first to e::::ploit

the durative connotations

o·::' einai by a systematic cont"i.·ast with gignesthat, the verb which normally pro

vides an aorist for ei_pai,
of acnieving a new state,

as in Plato,

underpinning

and uhich exprosseo

the developmental idea

of emerging as novelty or as event.

the durative-present aspect of e��na1:

oc·:

bL·th,

In Parmcnides

t h us provides the linguistic

for the antithesis in which Being is opposed to Becoming ns stabi

lity to flux. 9

(3)

This intrinsically stable and lasting character of Being in Greek -

-which makes it so appropriate as tho object of knouing nnd the correlati.ve of
truth

-- distinguishes

it in a radical

way

from our modern notion of existence,

insofar as the latter has preserved any of the original semantic flavor of

Latin cxsistere.

For the aspectual

discrepant with those of

features of

the Latin verb are entirely

e:�na1:, and actually closer to _gignesthai_,

cally exsistere suggests a standing-out or a stepping

being, an eme:cgence out of a dark background into the

guistic structure of the verb reinforces this idea,

forth,

Etymologi

a coming-into

light of day.

The lin

since the preverb _e�::

implies the completion of a process while the aspect of the reduplicated pre
sent is punctual rather than durative

(in contrast

to staE_£).10

Instead oS:

an antithesis to Becoming, _existentia provides as it ue;_·e the perfect of
gignesthai:

the state achieved as a result of the p;.·ocess of coming-to-be.

And in fact the sense of existence was originally acquired by the verb in the
perfect:

the existent was conceived literally as nwhat has emerged", id guod

exstitit.11

Now what has emerged into the light of day is in a sense the

contingent, what might not have emerged and what might easily disappear once

more.

Under the influence oE

the Biblical notion o:E Creation,and the radical

distinction betueen essence and

existence which

folloc1s from it in the medieval
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-10warld is an X".
The importance of the locative associations of einai for an understanding
of the ordinary existential use of the verb may be a matter on which philolo
gists will disagree.
But I think there can be no disagreement on the close

connection between the ideas of existence and location in Greek philosophical
thought.
We have from Presocratic times the well-est l blished axiom that
As 1: lato puts it
whatever is, is somewhere· what is nowhere is nothing. !+
'

--

-

-

----

(stating not his own view, but th.2t of Greek common sense), "we say that what
is neither on earth nor anywhere in heaven is nothing at all" (�. 52B).
If

-,----

--

--

existence and location are not identical in Greek thought,
logically equivalent,

average man,
goras,

for they imply one another.

and for the philosophers before Plato.

That is,

they are at least
they do for the,

Hence the � of Anaxa

which is as spiritual or"mental11 a power as he could conceive,

less thought of as located in place,

else isn

is nonethe

namely in the same place 'iwhere everything

The principle of Love for Empedocles is an invisible force

(fr. 14).

of attraction and a general law of combination by rational proportion,

but

it is also to be found 11swirling amongn the other elements, 11equal to them in

Even the Being of Parmenides, the most
(fr. 17, 20-25).
metaphysical concept in Presocratic thought, is compared to a sphere, and con

length and breadth11

ceived as a solid mass extending equally in a ll directions.

that Greek thought was instinctively concrete:
local connotations.

And so Plato,

It is not merely

the very notion of being had

when for the first time he clearly intro

duced non-spatial e9tities into a philosophical theory,

his new Forms in a hew kind of place.

was careful to situate

What we ar e in the habit of calling the

11intelligible world" is presented by Plato quite literally as an intelligible

region or place, the noetos topos,

to sense-experience,

conceived by analogy with the region known

but sharply contrasted with it, in order to serve as the

setting for Plato's radically new view of Being.
How did the new view of Being arise?

question.

There could be many answers to this

I would like to end by suggesting one which may at the same time

serve as a summary of the main points I have tried to make.

We began by admHting with Aristotle and Mill that "to be11 is not univocal,

and that any doctrine of Being is obliged to reckon '07ith a plurality of senses.
Furthermore,

the range of meaning of einai in Greek is likely to be wider and

richer than that of the corresponding verb in any other language -- and certainly
richer than the verb "to be" in most modern languages.
For that very reason,

the traditional dichotomy between the existential and the predicative use of the
verb would have to be rejected for Greek as a hopeless oversimplification,

if it were not vitiated from the start by the confusion between a syntactic

and a semantic criterion.

even

The syntactic distinction between the absolute and

predicative constructions is a problem for grammarians,

one.

and perhFtPS a difficult

But I do not see that it is of any great importance for an understanding
Even more negligible is the question of the omission
of the philosophic usage.15
of the verb esti,

which is sometimes regarded as a characteristic feature of

the copulativeconstruction.

(In fact the omissi on of the verb seems to be a

purely stylistic feature, dictated by c�nsiderations of elegance or economy,
The view
and with no necessary relation to the syntax or meaning of the verb.

that the predicative verb may be omitted,
Democritus'

famous statement in fr. 19,

custom bitter, by

the existential not,

"by custom (nomos) there is sweet,

custom hot, by custom color,

by

but in reality there are atoms

and the void,11 is the very model of an existential assertion,
;;to be" is omitted in every clause, including the last).
i�1at I have tried to do, then,

is a pure myth.

but the verb

is to clarify the semantic content and
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but its being determinately so, as a man or a 4og or a triangle.
The Forms of Plato and the essences of Aristotle are certainly not proposi

tional in character, but they might thus be compared to open sentences, with
an unfilled place for the subject.
Even this comparison is far from satis
factory

(since neither Form nor essence is a linguistic entity),

put forward with all the diffidence it deserves.

and it is

Hhat I mean to suggest

is that Form and essence shobld be understood as proposition-like or proposi

tion-generating.

And even if this turned out to be false for the special

doctrines of Form and essence,
For my contention is,

first,

my main contention here would not be affected.

that the terms on and onta are normally and

idiomatically used for facts of a propositio'Ml structure;

and,

second,

that

just as to eon in Herodotus regularly constitutes the object of a verb of know
ing or saying,
speech.

so "beingn enters philosophy as the object of knowledge and true

Now it is only natural for the object of knowing to be conceived of

after the pattern of propositions,
what is the case:

a fact,

or "object11 as such.

for what can be known and truly stated is

situation,

or relationship,

not a particular thing

The chief discrepancy between the Greek concept of

Being and the modern notion of existence lies precisely here,
assign existence not to facts or propositions or relations,
particulars:

to creatures, persons,

for we normally

but to discrete

or things.

Of course the Greek use of einai for localized existence tends to blur
this distinction,

since what is "SOme'Where is normally an individual entity,

precisely the kind of thing t�which the modern notion of existence applies.

When what i.s is used in this locative sense, it inevitably tends to be con
ceived as thing-like rather than as fact- like.
Greeks lack our notion of existence,

It is not so much that the

as that they lack our sense of its

distinctness from essence or from the being-so of fact and predication.

This

is true not only for the metaphysicians, but also (as we saw) for a philosopher

of common sense like ?rotagoras.

To put the matter in a nutshell, the ontological vocabulary of the Greeks
lad them to treat the existence of things and persons as a special case of the

�estehen � Sachverhalte.

It is remarkable that not only onta but every other

Greek word for 11fact11 can also mean 11thing", and vice versa:-(Cf. chremata

=

pragmata in the fragment of Protagoras; ergon in the contrast with logos:
"in fact" and "in word" gegonota as the perfect of onta,

etc.) This failure

on the part of the Greeks (at least before the Stoics) to make a systematic
dictinction between fact and thing underlies the more superficial and inaccurate
charge that they confused the nto be11 of predication with that of existence.
It may be thought that the negl4ct of such a distinction constitutes a
serious shortcoming in Greek philosophy of the classical period.

But it was

precisely this indiscriminate use of einai and� which permitted the metaphysi
cians to state the problem of truth and reality in its most general form,

to

treat matters of fact and existence concerning the physical world as only a

part of the problem

(or as one of the possible answers),

ontological question itself:
true knowledge,

What is Being?

the basis for true speech?

that is,

and to ask the

What is the object of

If this is a question worth asking,

then the ontological vocabulary of the Greeks, which permitted and encouraged
them to ask it,

must be regarded as

a

distinct philosophical asset.

^_hNfÃ

5Ã

`}Ã s±§©xÃ r¬Ã n~±n~xªÃ vÃ nµxÃ vx¶sxªÃ }§Ã n~Ã ¬xªxÃ vªs¬ª Ã
r±¬Ã ¬x»Ã vx¡xvÃ ±¡Ã xÃ ±ªxÃ }Ã vx}¬xÃ nvÃ vx}¬xÃ n§® sxªÃ §nx§Ã
¬nÃ ±¡Ã ¬n¬Ã }Ã ¬xÃ ¶x§rÃ

HvÃ Q§xxÃ ªÃ ¬nr»Ã }§xx§Ã ¬nÃ N~ªÃ

Ã ¬xÃ ±ªxÃ nvÃ ªª Ã }Ã r¬Ã n§¬sxªÃ
7Ã

]Ã rxx¶xvÃ ¬n¬Ã ªÃ }n¬x§Ã ·n©Ã ¬xÃ }§©¬Ã ·Ã vª¬s¬»Ã sn§ns¬x§½xvÃ
  fxxÃ n©Ã ¬xÃ »±~x§Ã ]ªÃ sx¬ªÃ Ã ¬xÃ
¬xÃ nr~±¬»Ã
ªxsvÃ xv¬Ã }Ã ZnxªÃ ]ªÃ Hn»©©Ã }Ã ¬xÃ axxnÃ }Ã ¬xÃ T±nÃ ]vÃ
5@<A Ã V Ã 5@7Ã Ã :9Ã

8Ã

U·Ã s±vÃ xÃ x¹«x¬nÃ ªxªxÃ rxÃ }¬¬xvÃ Ã H§ª¬¬xªÃ nn»ªªFÃ
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-3fullest treatment is in s. Mansion,

Le jugernent d'existence chez Aristote

(1946), who notes that Aristotle assigns no definite sense to the existence
of a thing considered apart from its essence (p. 243;
16

Republic V 478A-E.

Cf. Timaeus 28A-C2.

cf. 260-265).

